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CURBING THE RECALCITRANT POLLUTER: POST-
DECREE JUDICIAL AGENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LITIGATION 
Stuart P. Feldman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent suit brought by the United States Justice Department 
to enjoin the cleanup of a hazardous chemical waste site, the defen-
dants presented several remediation plans to the court for review. 1 
By the defendants' estimates, the proposals' costs ranged from 
$210,000 to $75,500,000,2 a staggering expense that threatened fi-
nancial hardship to the smaller defendant companies. Beyond the 
defendants' calculus but essential to the court's decree, however, 
was the inestimable risk to neighboring communities and natural 
resources should the abatement fail to halt fully the contamination's 
spread. 
This case illustrates that a court's choice of a remedy may be as 
critical to the litigants' interests and the public weal as the substan-
tive conduct rul~s that establish polluters' liability. Whether acting 
pursuant to centuries-old common law doctrine3 or recently enacted 
environmental statutes,4 federal courts,5 using their equitable pow-
• Topics Editor and Articles Editor, 1990-1991, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AF-
FAIRS LAW REVIEW. The author thanks the LAW REVIEW's 1990-1991 Executive Board for 
its patience, prodding, and help. 
1 United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 216 (W.D. Mo. 1985), afl'd 
in part sub nom. In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1985). 
2 Id. 
a See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text. 
6 This Comment focuses on suits brought in the federal courts. State courts, however, hold 
similar statutory and equitable powers and may take an even more active role in environmental 
policymaking and enforcement than the federal courts. See, e.g., Michigan Environmental 
Protection Act of 1970, MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 691.1201-.1207 (1970) (MICH. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 14.528(201)-(207) (Callaghan 1989)) (authorizing Michigan courts to grant injunctive relief, 
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ers, must forge appropriate remedies to proven and continuing vio-
lations of law. 6 
To assure meaningful redress, federal courts may appoint judicial 
agents, such as special masters and post-decree monitors,7 to gather 
information impartially that a court may use either to craft injunc-
tions or to survey defendants' compliance with a decree.8 Courts 
have supervised, through judicial delegates, state and municipal 
facilities to protect individuals' federal constitutional rights to fair 
housing,9 unprejudiced public education,1O and humane treatment in 
custodial institutions. ll Complex environmental suits, dominated by 
concerns for the public welfare, also present compelling grounds for 
continuous judicial supervision of a recalcitrant polluter's operations. 
Nonetheless, courts have hesitated to adopt such an active manner 
in environmental enforcement. As non-majoritarian and generalist 
bodies,12 courts are unwilling to intrude on the institutional prerog-
review administrative standards, and direct the adoption of new standards if needed to protect 
the state's natural resources); see also West Michigan Environmental Action Council v. Natural 
Resources Comm'n, 405 Mich. 741, 752, 275 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1979) (holding that trial judge 
erred in deferring to state agency on likelihood of impairment to natural resources because 
court had a duty under the environmental protection act to perform an independent de novo 
determination), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979); Eyde v. Michigan, 82 Mich. App. 531, 539, 
267 N.W.2d 442, 447 (1978) (upholding master's appointment to oversee restoration of plain-
tiff's land in suit brought under the environmental protection act); Lakeland Property Owners 
Assoc. v. Township of Northfield, 2 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,331, 20,336 (Mich. 
Cir. Ct., Livingston Cty. 1972) (ordering state Resources Commission to adopt water quality 
standards crafted by the court). 
6 See generally F'arber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties and Environmental Injunc-
tions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513 (1984); Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 
70 CALIF. L. REV. 524, 527 (1982) (after finding a continuing violation of statutory law, a 
court cannot balance the equities to permit that violation to continue). Whether federal 
environmental statutes have altered the judiciary's traditional equitable discretion is unclear. 
Compare TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (court must enjoin defendant's clear violation 
of the Endangered Species Act) with Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313-18 
(1982) (court retains discretion to balance the equities and select an appropriate remedy that 
may permit Clean Water Act violations to continue). 
7 Special masters are judicial adjuncts who help a court, in part, to form an injunction. 
Post-decree monitors, in contrast, serve as a court's eyes and ears after a decree has been 
issued. Courts may appoint special masters under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Rules). FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a). Monitorship, in contrast, is not expressly recognized in the 
Federal Rules. Rather, the term was crafted by commentators and the courts. See Ruiz v. 
Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1169-70 (5th Cir.) (upholding district court's reference to a special 
master under Federal Rule 53, and to monitors under the court's general equity powers), 
aff'd in part, vacated in part, reh'g. denied in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
460 U.S. 1043 (1983). 
8 See infra notes 64-149 and accompanying text. 
9 Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37, 38 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
10 Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737,743-46 (6th Cir. 1979). 
11 Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189, 193-94 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
12 See Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 N. Y. U. L. REV. 498, 512 (1977) 
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atives of administrative agencies, which have been designated by 
Congress in many statutes as the primary authors of environmental 
policy.13 Some courts, therefore, have limited their role to reviewing 
procedural fairness in agency rulemaking and adjudication. 14 
When courts have exercised continuous guidance in the post-judg-
ment resolution of environmental disputes, they may have acted at 
the request of a regulatory agency or a regulated entity. Several 
municipalities, for example, have conceded their inability to operate 
their sewage treatment plants in compliance with federal Clean 
Water Act pollutant discharge standards15 and have invited judicial 
supervision as a palliative to the political bickering that stymied 
remedial efforts. 16 In other cases, polluters have attempted to evade 
environmental liabilities by transferring assets to subsidiaries or 
shell corporations17 or otherwise have displayed their unwillingness 
to adhere to the court's orders. In these egregious circumstances, 
courts have supplanted the defendants' management by imposing 
receivership. 18 
More commonly, however, the defendants' environmentally inju-
rious operations have high social value, or produce goods or services 
that are essential to the local or national economies. 19 The equities 
(discussing courts' reticence to review deeply legislative and agency environmental policies 
because of courts' lack of technical and scientific expertise, but rejecting this self-imposed 
judicial restraint and urging a more active judicial role in substantive environmental decision-
making). 
13 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(d), 1319(a), 1361(0 (1988); Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6911, 6912, 6963 (1988). 
14 Judge Bazelon, for example, eschewed substantive judicial review of technical data that 
underlay environmental agency decisions but promoted the expansion of procedural rights for 
parties who appeared before an agency. See Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
541 F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 
(1976); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-53 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Judge Bazelon's opinions were criticized by his colleagues on the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as both an abdication of the judicial duty 
to conduct substantive review of administrative action, Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 68-69 
(Leventhal, J., concurring), and as beyond the statutory confines of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1988). See Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The 
Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 389-90 (1974). 
15 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (1988). 
16 See United States v. Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979). See generally Little, 
Court-Appointed Special Masters in Complex Environmental Litigation: City of Quincy v. 
Metropolitan District Commission, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435 (1984). 
17 See Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1455 (W.D. Mich. 1988); United 
States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 671 F. Supp. ')95, 619-22 (E.D. Ark. 1987), vacated without 
opinion, 855 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1988). 
18 See Vertac, 671 F. Supp. at 623; Comment, Court-Created Receivership Emerging as 
Remedy for Persistent Noncompliance with Environmental Laws, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 10,059 (1980). 
19 See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
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of these cases dictate against immediate or total abatement. Rather, 
they suggest the need to revamp the polluters' procedures. In other 
environmental suits, litigation may reveal that state or federal reg-
ulatory agencies failed to restrain defendants' proven wrongful con-
duct and that defendants' operations raise the specter of recurring 
harm.20 The value of prospective injunctions and judicial oversight 
through court-appointed agents is most visible in these instances. 
By maintaining an active posture in the post-judgment phases of 
litigation, courts insure effective relief to injured plaintiffs and to 
the public, thereby performing their statutory duties and acting 
within their traditional equitable role. 
This Comment first explores the courts' equitable discretion and 
the nature of injunctions. Section III reviews the functions served 
by special masters, post-decree monitors and receivers in environ-
mental litigation. Section IV compares these judicial adjuncts to 
administrative agents and suggests the need for greater procedural 
safeguards in judicial references to court-appointed officers. 
20 Litigation over the recent catastrophic oil spill from the Exxon supertanker Valdez, for 
example, illustrates the role that may be played by judicial agents in determining and enforcing 
injunctive relief when agencies have failed to stem continuing violations of environmental 
regulations. Shortly after midnight on March 24, 1989, the Valdez struck a reef in Prince 
William Sound near Valdez, Alaska. The tanker released nearly 11 million gallons of toxic 
crude oil into the Alaskan bay. See Alaska's Big Spill---Can the Wilderness Heal?, NATIONAL 
GEOGRAPHIC, Jan. 1990, at 5. 
Prior to the accident, an elaborate legislative and administrative framework had been 
created to ensure timely response to large spills. Complaint at 11-13, State of Alaska v. Exxon 
Corp., No. 3AN-89-06852 CIV (3d Judicial Dist., Sup. Ct., Alaska filed Aug. 15, 1989). To 
allay public concerns and facilitate the granting of needed authorizations, the owners and 
operators of the vast Trans-Alaskan pipeline system had promised regulators that they would 
take preventive steps, including the maintenance of a 24-hour task force in Valdez, to assure 
response readiness. I d. at 13. Instead, the operators of the pipeline network apparently acted 
in continual disregard of agreements made with regulators. Id. The responsible agencies failed 
to detect breaches of administrative standards or enforce statutory compliance. See Davidson, 
Exxon Not The Only CUlprit In Oil Spill, Boston Globe, Mar. 4, 1990, at 69, col. 4. 
The State of Alaska and other plaintiffs have asked the Alaskan and federal courts to award 
monetary judgments and to order environmental restoration. Complaint at 40-42, State of 
Alaska v. Exxon Corp., No. 3AN-89-06852 CIV (3d Judicial Dist., Sup. Ct., Alaska filed Aug. 
15, 1989); see also Complaint at 32, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Exxon Corp., No. 3AN-89-2533 
CIV (3d Judicial Dist., Sup. Ct., Alaska filed Aug. 17, 1989). In supervising this litigation, 
the courts will review the conduct of the industry defendants and of federal and state envi-
ronmental regulatory agencies. If the evidentiary record reveals a pattern of agency inaction 
in curbing continuing defendant misconduct, the courts may determine that economic damages 
and terrestrial restoration alone are insufficient remedies. See Z. Plater, Judicial Remedies 
for the Prevention of Future Oil Spills 3 (Dec. 1989) (report for the use of the State of Alaska 
Oil Spill Commission). 
Rather, the courts may issue equitable decrees to alter corporate behavior fundamentally 
within the Alaskan oil industry. Judicial agents could aid the courts in understanding the 
industry's workings and in implementing and overseeing the court's decrees. Id. 
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II. JUDICIAL EQUITABLE DISCRETION 
A. Injunctions 
Whether seeking redress for harm to private property or com-
plaining on behalf of the general public, environmental plaintiffs 
often request injunctive relief from the courts. Injunctions are ju-
dicial orders that require defendants to perform specific acts or to 
refrain from particular acts, under threat of fines or imprisonment. 21 
Plaintiffs desire these tailored commands because they believe that 
monetary compensation will not vindicate injuries to their interests 
or prevent defendants' further misconduct. 22 
Injunctions are attractive to environmental plaintiffs because of 
their strength and flexibility.23 Backed by a court's criminal contempt 
powers24 and crafted to address specific past and future harm, in-
junctions can be molded to halt a defendant's operations completely, 
to reform the most injurious aspect, or to establish performance 
21 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.9, at 98-103 (1973). Regardless 
of whether an injunction is mandatory or prohibitory in form, a defendant's future conduct 
will be altered by the order in some way, and the issuing court will retain jurisdiction to alter 
and enforce its decree. United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1988). In actions 
"at law," by comparison, a plaintiff seeks money for its injuries. If the plaintiff succeeds, the 
court will award a judgment and authorize a sheriff to execute the award by attaching 
property. Id. § 1.3, at 10. The court is relatively unconcerned with the execution process. Id. 
22 See, e.g., Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 94, reh'g. denied, 294 U.S. 732 (1935); 
Lee v. Brickel, 292 U.S. 415, 421 (1934); Borom v. St. Paul, 289 Minn. 371, 376, 184 N.W.2d 
595, 598 (1971). 
In his book Defending the Environment, Professor Sax promoted citizen participation in 
environmental suits. Sax contrasted injunctive relief with legal damages: 
Lawsuits seeking money damages for the public, by and large, are of secondary 
importance in environmental controversies. Most of the interests sought to be pro-
tected could not be easily compensated in damages in any event. Clean air and water 
for public use, scenic vistas, and the maintenance of fisheries and recreation areas, 
even where demonstrably harmed, rarely matter in significant dollar amounts to any 
particular identifiable citizen. The effects of environmental conditions are diffuse both 
in space and time, and rarely will a damage suit achieve the results sought. This is 
not to assert that such suits should be banned-only that they are not appropriately 
at the cutting edge of the movement for environmental quality. The prospect of 
damage suits may have some deterrent effect, but they tend to drag on interminably, 
with little result. Our attention need not be focused on them. Of course, damage 
suits brought by particular individuals who have suffered personal harm, such as 
those commonly brought by landowners against neighboring factories, will continue. 
Relief against such damage has always been available at law; it is only remedies 
sought on behalf of the community at large that is under inquiry here. 
J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 119-20 (1971). 
23 Plater, supra note 6, at 544. 
24 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1918). See generally 
Note, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1965). 
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standards. 25 In contrast to statutory remedies, which necessarily are 
designed for wide application, permanent injunctions are granted 
after an adversarial hearing and the development of an evidentiary 
record. 26 Compared to administrative remedies, injunctions are sub-
ject to fewer political and bureaucratic pressures. 27 Creative injunc-
tions ultimately may spawn legislative or administrative guidelines. 28 
B. The Public Welfare as an Element in Equitable Balancing 
Another distinctive characteristic of equitable remedies is judicial 
concern for the effect of a court's decree on community interests. 
After determining liability, a court faces two difficult decisions: first, 
whether to grant injunctive relief; and second, how to tailor the 
terms of its order and the scope of the order's intrusiveness. In both 
decisions, a court will balance the social value of the tortious or 
unlawful activity against the complained-of injury. 29 
Because the courts believed that the public generally benefited 
from defendants' enterprises, however offensive, traditional equity 
doctrines hindered private actions to enjoin defendant businesses. 3o 
25 Plater, supra note 6, at 544. 
26 See generally Winner, The Chancellor's Foot and Environmental Law: A Call for Better 
Reasoned Decisions on Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENVTL. L. 477 (1979). 
27 See J. SAX, supra note 22, at 108. 
28 See generally Oakes, supra note 12, at 516. 
29 W. PROSSER, P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 88A, at 630 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. See generally Plater, supra 
note 6, at 535. 
30 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 220, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871, 309 
N. Y.S.2d 312, 314 (1970). Traditionally, plaintiffs' actions sounded in common law nuisance or 
trespass. Nuisance is defined as an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of 
property. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 87, at 619. Common law trespass, by 
comparison, entails an actual physical invasion of land. Id. § 13, at 67-69. These common law 
actions are largely the foundation upon which many federal environmental laws were con-
structed, and are still invoked by plaintiffs. See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1142 (D. Conn. 
1980). 
Plaintiffs may seek equitable relief for harm to aesthetic interests as well as for purely 
pecuniary injury to property. Indeed, plaintiffs do not need to allege ownership in the affected 
property. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973). In SCRAP the Court held that the plaintiff environ-
mental group had standing in federal court to sue the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
in an action to enjoin the ICC from permitting railroads to increase their fares. Id. at 683-
90. Plaintiff claimed that higher freight rates would discourage use of recyclable materials 
and promote mining, lumbering, and other environmentally damaging activities on neighboring 
public lands. The Court reasoned that "aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic 
well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life of our society." Id. at 686 (quoting 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972». 
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Courts still recognize that socially encouraged commercial ventures 
incidentally may present environmental dangers, or that municipal 
agencies that fulfill necessary functions may operate, at least tem-
porarily, outside of statutorily mandated standards. 31 
Some early equity cases recognized, however, that the public's 
right to a clean environment may outweigh even large commercial 
projects. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper CO.,32 the state of Georgia 
asked the United States Supreme Court to enjoin two copper smelt-
ing factories located near the Georgia-Tennessee border. 33 Gases 
emitted from the plants created acid rain that killed Georgia forests 
and orchards. 34 The Court found the defendant liable for the pollu-
tion, but hoped that the parties would stipulate to a workable solu-
tion. 35 When, after seven years, the parties had failed to agree, the 
Court dictated environmental operating standards designed to allow 
commercial activity while reducing the threat to Georgia lands to 
acceptable levels. 36 
The Court limited the sulphur content percentage permitted in 
defendant's waste fumes and specified the maximum allowable 
amount of emissions. 37 The Court further ordered the defendant to 
keep detailed daily records, and to provide unfettered access to its 
facilities to a Court-appointed inspector.38 The inspector reviewed 
the defendant's operations biweekly and measured the continuing 
impact of the pollution on Georgia farmland. 39 Based on these obser-
31 See, e.g., United States v. Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 611 (D.R.I. 1980). 
32 206 U.S. 230 (1907), decree entered, 237 U.S. 474 and 237 U.S. 678 (1914), modified, 240 
U.S. 650 (1916). 
33 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. at 23l. 
34 Id. at 236. The original action focused on Georgia's standing to bring suit because it 
owned little of the damaged lands. The Court, through Justice Holmes, held that a state "has 
an interest independent of and behind its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain." 
Id. at 237. Had defendant been located within Georgia, the state could have brought public 
nuisance criminal charges and civil claims. Id. at 232. Instead, the state was forced to turn 
to the Court, which exercised its original jurisdiction and reasoned that injunctive relief was 
proper because Georgia's sovereign interests could not be reduced to money. Id. at 238. Using 
the same facts but performing a more traditional balancing of the equities, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court determined that the defendant factory's smelting was a continuing nuisance 
to nearby farmers, but denied injunctive relief, holding that the plaintiff farmers could be 
adequately compensated for the destruction of their lands. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, 
Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 366-67, 83 S.W. 658, 666-67 (1904). 
35 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 239. 
36 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474, 478 (1914), modified, 240 U.S. 650 
(1916). The compromise decree sought to "diminish materially the present probability of 
damage" to Georgia and its inhabitants. Id. at 477. 
37 Id. at 477-78. 
38 Id. 
39 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916). 
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vations, the inspector made recommendations to the Court for future 
equitable relief. 40 The Court also maintained the case on its docket 
to enable the parties to apply easily for modifications to the decree. 41 
Tennessee Copper illustrates the judiciary's willingness to become 
deeply involved in a corporate defendant's business when less intru-
sive solutions are unlikely to achieve the court's desired balance, or 
the interests of the public welfare are impugned. 42 The Tennessee 
Copper decision predates the advent of our current legislative and 
administrative environmental regulatory regime. Federal environ-
mental laws, however, are founded largely on common law doctrine. 43 
In codifying the common law causes of action, Congress retained the 
federal courts' traditional equitable remedies. 44 
Indeed, Congress established statutory grounds for the courts' 
expansion of judicial equitable discretion to address violations of 
environmental laws. 45 Most environmental statutes contain injunc-
tive enforcement provisions. 46 Some, like the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),47 
direct the federal courts to balance the equities, including the public 
interest. 48 
CERCLA, as well as many other federal environmental 
statutes, also provide for Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) civil enforcement actions49 to prevent "imminent en-
40 Id. 
41 I d. at 651. 
42 Equity courts will go "much farther ... in furtherance of the public interest than they 
are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved." Virginian Ry. v. System 
Fed'n No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't of the Am. Fed'n of Labor, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937). 
43 See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 199 (D.C. Mo. 
1985) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988), is 
codification of the common law of public nuisance), a/I'd in part sub nom. In re Armco, 770 
F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1985); S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5019, 5023 (RCRA § 6973 "incorporates the legal theories used 
for centuries to assess liability for creating a public nuisance ... and to determine appropriate 
remedies in common law"). 
44 See, e.g., United States V. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984); United 
States V. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Comment, Environmental Resto-
ration Orders, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 171, 197 (1985). 
45 See, e.g., Price, 688 F.2d at 211. 
46 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1988); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988); 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988). 
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
48 I d. § 9606(a) (1988) (abatement actions). 
49 Id. In addition to EPA enforcement actions, many federal environmental laws authorize 
citizen suits against the government and polluters, to guard against EPA laxity in enforcing 
its orders and regulations. See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988). Only the government may seek injunctive relief, however, under 
CERCLA's imminent hazard provisions. United States V. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 
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dangerment"50 to the "public health or welfare or the environment. "51 
Courts broadly interpret the quoted phrases, responding to the sci-
entific and medical uncertainty inherent in evaluating potential en-
vironmental hazards. 52 For example, courts may issue injunctions 
when the EPA has demonstrated a risk of harm, rather than the 
more stringent requirement of threatened irreparable harm. 53 Ad-
ditionally, statutory provisions for compensatory remedies will not 
preclude a court's grant of injunctive relief, altering an equity maxim 
that courts do not issue equitable orders when adequate legal rem-
edies exist. 54 
Having decided that equitable relief is necessary or appropriate, 
a court may maintain jurisdiction over the dispute to review sua 
sponte any changed facts or the terms of its order. 55 A court does 
not need to reserve explicitly its jurisdiction over the controversy. 56 
Just as a court will not force a plaintiff to bring numerous claims for 
money damages in response to an ongoing tort or statutory violation, 
it will not issue an injunction that can be enforced only by a fresh 
suit or a formal reopening of the action. 57 Rather, federal courts can 
enforce their injunctions under their continuing jurisdiction through 
supplementary or contempt proceedings. 58 Additionally, changes in 
law or the facts, or in the defendant's attitude and behavior, may 
lead a court to modify or dissolve its order. 59 
During the time between a court's decision actively to oversee the 
enforcement of the remedy and the court's determination that future 
defendant misconduct is unlikely to occur, a court may turn to its 
agents for help. To effectuate its decree a court may desire impartial 
fact-findingGo or a judicial representative's presence within the de-
1027, 1052 (D. Mass. 1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990); McGregor v. Indus. Excess 
Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401, 1408-09 (N.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1988). 
50 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
51 Id. 
52 See Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 519-20 (8th 
Cir. 1975), modified sub nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976); B.F. 
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89, 96 (D. Conn. 1988). 
63 United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); B.F. Goodrich, 697 F. Supp. at 
95. 
54 See United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 212-13 (D.C. Mo.), 
aff'd in part sub nom. In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1985). 
55 See Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354, 359 (N.D. Ohio 1969). 
56 United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1988). 
57 See McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 1985). 
68 Suntex Dairy v. Bergland, 591 F.2d 1063, 1068 (5th Cir. 1979). 
59 Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 933 (1952). 
60 See United States v. Moss-American, 78 F.R.D. 214, 215 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (master 
appointed to supervise the taking of samples of defendant's soil). 
818 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [VoL 18:809 
fendant's organization. 61 Indeed, a court may decide to usurp man-
agement of the defendant's business. 62 Judicial references to court-
appointed agents, like all equitable orders, are flexible and tailored 
to the circumstances. Because the functions performed by special 
masters, monitors, and receivers vary in their intrusiveness into a 
defendant's operations, these agents occupy places along a spectrum 
that lacks bright line boundaries. 63 A court's aim in any reference is 
to enlist aid in ensuring that defendants comply with statutes or the 
common law, or to structure the substantive changes that the court 
feels are equitable. 
III. COURT-ApPOINTED ADJUNCTS 
A. Special Masters 
1. General Applications 
Faced with the daunting task of resolving complex environmental 
disputes, and driven by the need to remedy the public endangerment 
often posed by environmental hazards, federal courts have called 
upon special masters for aid at every stage of environmental litiga-
tion. Special masters perform a variety of judicial duties, including 
pretrial case management,64 fact-finding,65 and the development of 
equitable remedies both before, and after, liability has been estab-
lished. 66 
Historically, the special master was a frequently employed agent 
of the equity courtS. 67 Courts long assumed an inherent power to 
61 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1326-27 (E.D. 
Pa. 1978), afl'd, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979). 
62 See Town of Greenwich v. Department of Transp., 10 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20,178,20,181 (D. Conn. 1980). 
63 See Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1326-27 (creating judicial network of monitors and 
special master to oversee systemic reform of state hospital). 
64 See United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1471-72 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (reviewing 
role played by special master during suit's liability phase); United States v. Hardage, 7 Fed. 
R. Servo 3d 266, 272 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (court's reference order to master at the suit's outset). 
65 See United States v. Moss-American, 78 F.R.D. 214, 215 (E.D. Wis. 1978). 
66 City of Quincy v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, Civ. No. 138,477 (Mass. Super. Ct., Norfolk 
Cty. filed Dec. 17, 1982). 
67 Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1297, 1322 (1975); see also W.D. Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks to Special 
Masters: Limitations on Existing Sources and the Needfor a New Federal Rule, in MANAGING 
COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 305, 337-64 
(W. Brazil, G. Hazard & P. Rice eds. 1983). 
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appoint special masters before the federal equity rules,68 and later, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules),69 codified the 
courts' discretionary reference authority. Indeed, judicial references 
to special masters were common in the Elizabethan English Chan-
cery courts. 70 Reference procedures were incorporated into United 
States federal judicial practice at the time of the federal judiciary's 
creation. 71 
Traditionally, the special master was the most benign of an equity 
court's agents. Appointed by nineteenth-century courts to relieve 
the judge of the courts' most routine duties, the special master 
originally performed clerical functions. 72 Gradually, courts delegated 
greater responsibilities to masters, ostensibly to expedite litigation. 
By the late nineteenth century, masters routinely were authorized 
to take evidence and to issue non-binding recommendations to the 
court. 73 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, general dissatisfaction 
with the highly formalized federal equity practices sparked a reform 
movement that greatly restrained the frequency with which courts 
assigned tasks to special masters.74 This movement culminated in 
the adoption of the Equity Rules of 1912,75 which emphasized the 
use of in-court oral testimony to force judges to assume a central 
adjudicatory role. 76 Equity Rule 59 established the requirement, 
later incorporated into Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b),77 that 
references to masters be justified by an "exceptional condition. "78 
The promulgation of the Federal Rules, while continuing the ex-
ceptional condition restriction, had other impacts on courts' refer-
ences to masters. The vastly expanded discovery process prompted 
68 See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 627, 666-
69 (1912). 
69 FED. R. Crv. P. 53(a). 
70 Silberman, supra note 67, at 1321-22. 
71 See Bryant, The Office of Master in Chancery: Colonial Development, 40 A.B.A. J. 595, 
595 (1954). 
72 See Dobray, The Role of Masters in Court Ordered Institutional Reform, 34 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 581, 586 (1982). 
73 Brazil, supra note 67, at 338-40. 
74 Id. In contrast to the increased restrictions on references to masters, courts continued 
to assign judicial tasks freely to bankruptcy receivers. The courts' need for these referees, to 
relieve overcrowded dockets, insured their survival. See Kaufman, Use of Special Pre-trial 
Masters in the "Big" Case, 23 F.R.D. 572, 575 (1960). 
75 226 U.S. 627, 666-69 (1912). 
76 Brazil, supra note 67, at 337. 
77 FED. R. Crv. P. 53(b). 
78 Id. 
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renewed interest in using masters to manage pretrial case develop-
ment. 79 Moreover, the addition of the Rule 53(e) command that, in 
non-jury actions, a master's findings must be accepted unless "clearly 
erroneous"80 raised the relative weight of a master's report and 
narrowed the scope of acceptable judicial delegations of power.81 In 
effect, the master's report became no longer simply advisory and 
judicial scrutiny of the report was reduced to appellate-type review. 82 
Rule 53 does not provide standards for the satisfaction of the 
"exceptional condition" requirement. It does, however, furnish the 
federal courts with discretionary authority to appoint masters de-
spite a party's objections.83 In 1957, the Supreme Court handed down 
its only recent interpretation of the limits of a court's discretionary 
reference power in La Buy v. Howes Leather CO. 84 Judge La Buy 
had appointed a special master to make both factual determinations 
and conclusions of law in resolving two antitrust actions.85 The judge 
cited calendar congestion, complex issues, and lengthy trial time as 
justification for his reference. 86 In rejecting these reasons as im-
proper, the Court warned trial courts against "abdicating their ju-
dicial functions"87 or "depriving the parties of trials before the court 
on the basic issues involved in the litigation."88 
The La Buy decision indicated that references of substantive legal 
issues for a master's determination would rarely, if ever, be proper. 89 
Undeterred by La Buy's proscription, however, courts continue to 
delegate broad tasks. 90 Judges are often reluctant to become mired 
too deeply in litigational thickets and feel unable to interpret, with-
out expert assistance, the overwhelming data that underlie many 
complex suits. 91 
79 Kaufman, supra note 74, at 578. 
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e). 
81 Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARV. L. REV. 779, 789 (1975). 
82 Id. 
83 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b). 
84 352 U.S. 249 (1957). 
85 Id. at 253-54. 
86 Id. at 254. 
87 Id. at 256. 
88 Id. 
89 See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2605, at 791 
(1971). 
90 Shortly after La Buy, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit approved 
a pretrial reference that authorized a master to supervise discovery. First Iowa Hydro Elec. 
Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613, 627 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
871 (1957), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 921 (1958). 
91 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 94 F.R.D. 173, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) 
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Appellate courts, too, are not unsympathetic to the caseload bur-
dens shouldered by the trial courtS. 92 On review, an appellate court 
may focus on the scope of authority delegated rather than on the 
satisfaction of the "exceptional condition" requirement. 93 The neces-
sity of a reference will be examined in terms of its practicality under 
the facts and circumstances present in the particuliar case. 94 
2. Environmental Application of Special Masters: Managing 
Complex Superfund Litigation 
In several recent actions brought by the United States govern-
ment under CERCLA95 to compel corporate defendants to clean up 
hazardous waste sites, trial judges have pointed to the "imminent 
public endangerment"96 present at these sites and the need for a 
speedy resolution as justification for references of pretrial duties to 
masters.97 Courts broadly interpret CERCLA's imminent endanger-
ment clause as statutory authorization for their exercise of equitable 
powers, including the appointment of equity officers, whenever the 
environment is endangered. 98 
A court's reference may authorize a master to become involved in 
every aspect of the litigation. In addition to pretrial case manage-
ment, which includes holding evidentiary hearings and ruling upon 
privilege motions,99 a master may have authority to determine dis-
positive pretrial motions, such as summary judgment and motions 
to dismiss. 10o Additionally, masters have been given front-line re-
(magnitude and complexity of anticipated discovery problems and need for "speedy processing" 
of the 4 million discovery documents justified master's appointment). 
92 See Jack Walter & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698,711-13 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 F.2d 1018 (1984). 
93 Id. 
94 See Wald, "Some Exceptional Condition"-The Anatomy of a Decision Under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 405, 417 (1988). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988). 
96 Id. 
97 United States v. Hardage, 7 Fed. R. Servo 3d 266, 268 (W.D. Okla. 1987); United States 
V. Conservation Chern. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 216 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd sub nom. In re 
Armco, 770 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1985). But see United States V. Hooker Chern. & Plastics Corp., 
123 F.R.D. 62, 63 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). 
98 United States V. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 192-93 (W.D. Mo. 1985); 
City of El Paso V. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984), aff'd in part and remanded 
in part sub nom. In re Applications of El Paso, 887 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1989). 
99 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 94 F.R.D. 173, 173-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
100 In 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a reference to a master to 
rule upon such motions, as properly within a broad grant of power to supervise discovery. In 
re Armco, Inc., 770 F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1985). The court's decision was heavily criticized 
by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit one year later, however, when the Court of 
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sponsibility to determine and oversee the relief that may be imple-
mented at the site. 101 
In light of the cost and intrusiveness of such references, it is not 
surprising that defendants challenge the courts' finding of imminent 
endangerment. 102 The defendants' argument is twofold: that the need 
for a prompt resolution cannot by itself satisfy the exceptional con-
dition prerequisite to the appointment of a master, as courts fre-
quently are called upon urgently to decide on matters in cases when 
life or property is threatened; secondly, that, within CERCLA, 
Congress already has provided sufficient governmental means to 
respond to the actual or threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances. 103 
In essence, defendants argue that CERCLA both authorizes and 
requires the EPA to respond to the risk of danger by unilaterally 
beginning remedial operations,104 backed by the authority of the 
National Contingency Plan105 and the financial support of the Haz-
ardous Substance Response Trust Fund. 106 When the site is under 
supervision, the EPA then should sue the responsible parties for 
reimbursement. In contrast to these mechanisms, defendants argue, 
CERCLA fails expressly to refer to or provide for the use of a 
master to expedite the litigation. 107 
Congress may curtail judicial references to equity agents fully, or 
merely limit the courts' use of these officers to specific contexts. 108 
In a recent Department of the Interior appropriations act, Congress 
removed the district courts' power to issue preliminary injunctions 
prohibiting the sale of timber from public lands, thereby discourag-
ing suits by environmental groupS.109 The statute also provides for 
expedited trials, however, and grants judges the express power to 
make broad references to special masters so that disputes may be 
resolved quickly. no 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied a similar reference order by a trial judge. In re United 
States, 816 F.2d 1083, 1091 (6th Cir. 1987). 
101 In re Armco, 770 F.2d at 105. 
102 See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 214 (W.D. Mo. 
1985), aff'd in part sub nom. In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1985). 
103 Appellant's Brief at 8, In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1985) (No. 85-1598). 
104 Id. at 9-10. 
105 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). 
106 Id. § 9611(a). 
107 Appellant's Brief at 10, In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1985) (No. 85-1598). 
108 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920). 
109 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-121 § 318(g), 103 Stat. 701, 749-50 (1989). 
110 Id. 
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B. Post-Decree Monitors 
1. General Applications 
The equitable monitor surveys the defendant's remedial efforts 
and, through its findings, facilitates judicial evaluation of the defen-
dant's capability and willingness to comply with a decree. lll A de-
termination of liability for violations of environmental permitting 
standards, for example, may suggest to a court that its goal should 
be to enforce compliance with those standards. 112 Still, the court 
must devise a method to force the defendant to achieve that end. 
Lacking the technical expertise to accomplish compliance when ad-
ministrative agencies may have failed, the court may choose initially 
to institute a remedial plan that lacks the specificity of architectural 
blueprints. Instead, the court may choose a method to provide expert 
assistance for both itself and the defendant. 113 
Monitorship is a means to elicit the defendant's cooperation in 
determining curative measures,114 to accomplish non-adversarial res-
olution of potential disputes concerning the remedy, and, impor-
tantly, to provide the plaintiffs and the court with a way to ascertain 
the defendant's good faith. To further these ends, the court may 
order a neutral observer placed within the defendant's entity115 or 
approve a monitoring committee chosen by the parties and repre-
senting their respective interests. 116 
A monitor's presence acts as a reminder of the court's authority 
and of public concern that the defendant company or government 
facility operate in a responsible fashion. The monitor may inform the 
defendant's employeesll7 and the community of the dispute, or, if 
11l See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216,248,265-67 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 
F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). 
112 See, e.g., United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 605 (consent decree 
based on Clean Water Act permit standards). 
113 Gary W. v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979). 
114 Note, Monitors: A New Equitable Remedy?, 70 YALE L.J. 103, 113 (1960). 
115 Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 564 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 
1977), rev'd in part 438 U.S. 781 (1978). 
116 See Note, supra note 114, at 104. Due to intra-board disagreements and self-interested 
evaluation of defendant's compliance, monitoring committees composed of the adversaries' 
representatives may be less effective at exposing and resolving disputes or in helping the 
court to forge a remedial strategy than non-partisan court-selected agents. See id. at 120; 
Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428, 
442 (1977). 
117 Note, supra note 114, at 119. 
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the defendant is a public agency, even invite community participation 
in implementing the decree. 118 
The monitor's mandate also may extend beyond surveillance for 
the court. A court may instruct a monitor to recommend compliance 
techniques to the defendant. 119 A reference to a monitor to gather 
information that is important to the court for adjusting the remedial 
plan may allow the monitor to consult specialists, perform inspec-
tions, and conduct ex parte investigations. 12o 
Monitors lack independent enforcement powers and cannot direct 
a defendant's conduct.l2l It is the monitor's role neither to create 
policy nor to assume operational control of an organization. 122 A 
monitor's reports may lead a court to apply sanctions or lift restric-
tions; but monitors are judicial agents, not judges. 
2. Environmental Application of Monitors: Judicial Oversight of 
Public Entities 
Given its restricted coercive powers, monitorship represents a 
measured exercise of equitable authority causing limited intrusion 
into a defendant's internal affairs. Because many federal environ-
mental laws apply not only to private defendants but also, with equal 
vigor, to federal, state, and municipal entities,l23 federal courts ad-
ministering statutory precepts may tread, although reluctantly, on 
the operations of other branches of government. Monitorship is es-
pecially attractive to federal courts asked to rule upon the workings 
of municipal corporations, or other government agencies, a situation 
in which a federal court will be mindful of federalism and separation 
118 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 265-67 (D. Mass. 1975), afl'd 530 F.2d 401 (1st 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). 
119 Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 179 (E.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd, 535 F.2d 864 (5th 
Cir.), reh'g denied, 539 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977). In Morgan the 
court charged a 40-member monitoring council to "foster public awareness" and delegated to 
it the primary responsibility for monitoring implementation of the court's school desegregation 
order. 401 F. Supp. at 265-67. The court granted the council authority to hold public meetings, 
make recommendations to the court and the defendant Boston School Committee, and identify 
"unresolved problems" for consideration by the parties, the court, and "other appropriate 
persons." [d. The council, though, was not given managerial duties. [d. 
120 Morgan, 401 F. Supp. at 266; Wyatt v Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 
afl'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
121 See Note, supra note 114, at 113. 
122 [d. 
123 See, e.g., Costle v. Pacific Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 201 (1980); Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1311 (1988). 
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of powers concerns not present when the defendant is a private 
company. 124 
United States v. City of Providence 125 illustrates a federal district 
court's measured control over the public management of a commu-
nity facility, even though Congress had created a justiciable action 
and administrative agencies had requested judicial intervention. The 
city, owner, and operator of a municipal sewage treatment plant had 
failed to comply with Clean Water Actl26 pollutant discharge stan-
dards, an EPA order, and two previously entered and judicially 
approved consent decrees.127 The United States District Court for 
the District of Rhode Island was asked to find the city in contempt 
and to impose monetary and equitable sanctions. Rhode Island asked 
the court to appoint a receiver for the treatment plant. l28 Another 
plaintiff, a citizens' action committee, requested that a special master 
examine the factual circumstances surrounding the defendant's ad-
mittedly noncompliant activities. 129 
The court rejected these suggestions. A master's examination, the 
court held, would be limited to detailing the city's violations of its 
operating permits and would not add to the court's ability to enforce 
the outstanding consent decrees. 130 Yet, the court was not ready to 
assume active management of the facility and supplant public officials 
or their agents. 
Instead, the court directed the Rhode Island environmental 
agency to monitor the treatment plant and ordered city officials to 
report monthly on their compliance efforts.131 This solution achieved 
several ends. It stymied the political fallout that inevitably follows 
a federal court's exercise of powers to influence local affairs. The 
decision also reinforced the state's familiar administrative role. 
Lastly, the solution allowed the city an opportunity to establish its 
good faith efforts to achieve compliance. 132 
124 See generally Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 270 
(Powell, J., concurring) (Clean Air Act's legislative history demonstrates that Congress knew 
that its stringent air quality standards would lead to the closing of some businesses, but it is 
unlikely that Congress intended to force the shut-down of a public utility), reh'g. denied, 429 
U.S. 873 (1976). See generally Comment, supra note 18, at 10,062. 
125 492 F. Supp. 602 (D.R.I. 1980). 
126 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988). 
127 Providence, 492 F. Supp. at 604-07. 
128 ld. at 610. 
129 ld. 
130 ld. 
131 ld. at 611. 
132 ld. The court granted Providence, Rhode Island, officials 90 days to demonstrate their 
credible desire to comply with the law and thereby absolve the contempt sanctions. However, 
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Monitors thus serve an important function in overseeing court-
ordered change and in gathering information from those who are 
affected by the court's decree, even if those individuals are not 
parties to the suit. 133 In accomplishing their task, monitors generally 
playa less intrusive role than masters or receivers. 
Nevertheless, litigants frequently challenge references to moni-
tors. For plaintiffs, monitorship creates a procedural barrier to ju-
dicial decisionmaking and the possibility of a compromised remedy. 
Defendants typically bear the substantial fees charged by monitors, 
who are usually well-paid experts. 134 
Additionally, defendants may question references that extend a 
monitor's investigatory powers to matters that area ancillary to the 
suit. 135 Such broad mandates may facilitate the determination of the 
most efficacious means to achieve a court's goals, yet they likely will 
increase a defendant's compliance burdens as well. By so empow-
ering its agents, a court may venture beyond the issues directly 
related to the case or controversy brought by the parties. 136 This 
judicial assumption of an investigatory role, litigants argue, may 
tarnish the court's reputation of impartiality and tread on executive 
and legislative prerogative to redress systematically the wrongs 
perceived by those branches of government. 137 
At times, courts hesitate to undertake broad factual determina-
tions in matters normally regulated by administrative agencies, be-
cause of a self-imposed judicial restraint known as the primary ju-
the court expressed its willingness to appoint a special master or receiver if the city continued 
to ignore the court's decree. Id. at 610. Other federal courts have used masters and receivers 
when monitorship and voluntary compliance techniques have failed. See Morgan v. Mc-
Donough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) (upholding receivership remedy for violation of court-
ordered school desegregation); United States v. Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979) 
(continual flouting of federal environmental statutes). 
133 See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 267 (D. Mass. 1975), afi'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 42611.S. 935 (1976). 
134 See Levine, Calculating Fees of Special Masters, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 143 (1985). 
135 See Note, Force and Will: An Exploration of the Use of Special Masters to Implement 
Judicial Decrees, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 112-17 (1980). 
136 Several commentators have pointed to the possible constitutional impropriety of broad 
investigatory references. See id.; Dobray, supra note 72, at 597-98. Several courts, too, have 
stressed that the litigants must retain their rights to challenge the equity agent's recommen-
dations at a hearing before the court. E.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240,245 (5th Cir. 
1979). These considerations are equally relevant to references to special masters and other 
post-judgment court agents. 
137 In Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit struck 
a reference to a special master who was appointed to supervise discovery and examine the 
defendant company's "conduct, property, liabilities, financial condition, books, records and 
assets," on the grounds that the district court had exceeded its judicial powers by authorizing 
the master to investigate matters not raised by the litigation. 145 F.2d 316, 318 (3d Cir. 1944), 
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945). 
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risdiction doctrine. 138 In disputes suffused with technical or policy 
considerations, a court may acknowledge an agency's greater expe-
rience and expertise and the need for uniform application of the law, 
by deferring to the agency's fact-finding even though a plaintiff has 
brought a justiciable claim. 139 
Yet, to help resolve complex disputes, courts do refer remedial 
tasks to equitable monitors and other post-decree agents. A court 
may seek and receive the litigants' consent to these appointments. 140 
For plaintiffs, monitors hip provides ongoing judicial attention and 
the opportunity to shift the cost of post-liability fact-finding to the 
defendants. 141 Defendants may acquiesce when more intrusive mea-
sures are threatened. 142 
When the parties' consent has not been given, a court must invoke 
another source of authority to justify an appointment. Unlike ref-
erences to special masters, procedurally codified in Federal Rule 
53,143 or to receivers, authorized under Federal Rule 66,144 there is 
no specific legislative empowerment for the judicial use of moni-
tors.145 In the absence of statutory proscription, however, courts 
assume an "inherent authority" to create the means deemed neces-
sary to achieve the court's ends and to ensure compliance with its 
decree. 146 
138 See Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952); MCI Communica-
tions Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 F.2d 214,220 (3d Cir. 1974). 
139 See MCI Communications, 496 F.2d at 220. But see O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 
523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The federal district court in O'Leary maintained jurisdiction 
in a suit brought under the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, as well as common law causes of action although a Pennsylvania environmental agency 
regulated defendant's operations. ld. at 647. The court held that its exercise of discretion 
under the enforcement provisions of these statutes would not disrupt the agency's regulatory 
authority and that the court was competent to rule on the issue presented. ld. Furthermore, 
the plaintiff's pleadings indicated that the agency had been ineffective in curtailing the dangers 
presented by defendant's landfill. ld. 
140 See Note, supra note 114, at 116. 
141 ld. 
142 ld. 
143 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a). 
144 FED. R. Cry. P. 66. 
145 Perhaps for this reason, some courts appoint "special masters" rather than "monitors" 
to conduct investigatory tasks. One court, for example, created an elaborate judicial surveil-
lance network in a case involving systemic reform of the state's prisons by directing monitors 
to report to a special master. See Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir.), reh'g 
denied, 564 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). 
146 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920). In an opinion by Justice Brandeis, the 
Court held that: 
Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to 
provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of 
their duties. This power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the 
court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise 
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There are two bases underlying the judicial claim to inherent 
power to appoint monitors.147 The first is the notion that federal 
courts, to maintain the constitutional equilibrium, must be able to 
"check" the actions of states and other branches of the federal gov-
ernment. 148 The second basis for this claim to judicial power is the 
pragmatic idea that, in order to function effectively, courts should 
be able to improve the efficiency of the adjudicatory process and to 
ensure respect for their orders. 149 
C. Receivers 
1. General Applications 
Monitors and special masters aid the court in the adjudication of 
a suit. Courts charge receivers, in contrast, with the active custody 
and management of an entity.l50 Receivership represents a judicial 
determination that the operator of an organization may be unwilling 
or incapable of acting in good faith toward compliance with a judg-
ment. 151 In this situation a court may take the unusuaP52 step of 
appointing an administrator to prevent imminent or irreparable 
harm to the parties' rights and interests. 153 The receiver ensures 
certainty in the execution of a court's order. 
in the progress of a cause. From the commencment of our Government it has been 
exercised by the federal courts, when sitting in equity, by appointing, either with or 
without the consent of the parties, special masters, auditors, examiners and com-
missioners. 
Id. at 312-13. 
147 Brazil, supra note 67, at 364-76. 
148 Id. at 364-65. 
149 Id. at 364, 376-77. Federal courts also claim inherent power to appoint special masters 
and receivers. First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613, 
627 (8th Cir. 1957) (special master appointed to manage discovery), eert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 
(1957), rek'g denied, 355 U.S. 921 (1958); Levin v. Garfinkle, 514 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (E.D. 
Pa. 1981) (inherent power to appoint bankruptcy receiver); Jordan v. Wolke, 75 F.R.D. 696, 
701 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (master charged with formulating temporary injunction); Gross v. Mis-
souri & A. Ry., 74 F. Supp. 242, 244 (W.D. Ark. 1947) (inherent authority to appoint receiver). 
Presumably because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize references to special 
masters and receivers, however, federal courts generally do not cite inherent power to justify 
their appointments. 
150 See 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 151, at 794 (1952). 
161 Johnson, Equitable Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial Neoreeeiverskips to Implement 
Large Scale Institutional Change, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1166-67. 
162 Receivership is usually termed an "extraordinary" remedy. Haase v. Chapman, 308 F. 
Supp. 399, 406 (W.D. Mo. 1969). 
153 Haase, 308 F. Supp. at 406; Johnson, supra note 151, at 1166. 
1991] POST -JUDGMENT AGENTS 829 
Insolvency receiverships are well-known and well-established. 1M 
The receivership remedy has not been limited to the bankruptcy 
arena, however, and has been employed in many other contexts as 
well. Courts have used receivers to enforce federal statutes such as 
antitrust laws. 155 Receivership is also an accepted practice in probate 
and estate dispute resolution. 156 
Moreover, federal courts have used receivership to protect civil 
and political rights from state infringement. 157 Changing judicial 
perceptions about the courts' role in the political and social process, 158 
and the expansion of personal rights, have facilitated the courts' 
exercise of their equitable powers to compel governmental compli-
ance with fourteenth amendment rights. 159 For example, courts have 
placed community school boards160 and state prisons161 under receiv-
ership. 
Courts, however, originally were slow to accept receivership as a 
method of protecting the general welfare or individual constitutional 
rights. Traditionally, receivers protected litigants' property rights 
only.162 In the mid-nineteenth century, however, courts recognized 
that private property concerns might impugn the public welfare. 163 
Courts used this power to assist many small communities that had 
developed along active rail lines. 164 When a railroad became insolvent 
and was threatened with dissolution, the courts realized, communi-
ties might face extinction. 165 Lacking statutory or common law guid-
ance, courts invoked their equitable powers to assume custody of 
rail properties and forestall creditors' liquidation. 166 
The courts appointed receivers to administer a railroad while the 
insolvent company's debts were adjusted. 167 Eventually the rail-
road's property was conveyed to new entities through judicial sales, 
and creditors' interests were enforced. The novelty of this judicial 
154 E.g., Gross v. Missouri & A. Ry. Co, 74 F. Supp. 242, 244 (W.D. Ark. 1947). 
155 E.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 188 (1911). 
156 Levin v. Garfinkle, 514 F. Supp. 1160, 1163-64 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
157 Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 
(1977); Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724, 730 (S.D. Ga. 1966). 
158 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,209 (1962). 
159 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). 
160 Turner, 255 F. Supp. at 730. 
161 See generally Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979). 
162 Johnson, supra note 151, at 1166. 
163 Id. at 1168. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 I d. at 1169. 
830 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:809 
approach lay in the courts' use of the bankruptcy receiver to repair, 
rather than dissolve, corporations. l68 This application of the courts' 
equitable powers was accepted easily because the public interest and 
the creditors' private concerns coincided. 
The municipal bond default cases of the late nineteenth century 
were, at the time, far more controversial. 169 These suits concerned 
the judicially compelled levying of local taxes to satisfy the interest 
and principal payments owed under municipal-revenue bonds. 170 
Towns that had issued railroad-aid bonds to induce rail extension to 
their communities often suspended payments when, for whatever 
reason, the railroad never came.171 To protect bondholders, the fed-
eral courts issued writs of mandamus to state officials, ordering the 
collection of taxes. Citizen resistance spurred the courts to place 
local treasuries under receivership and to charge federal marshals 
with responsibility for carrying out the court's judgment. 172 For the 
first time, the federal courts used their equitable powers to supplant 
local government. 173 
The judiciary's unprecedented intrusion in state and local affairs 
was not welcomed universally. In one case a decree was enforced 
only after President Grant indicated his willingness to use force. 174 
The courts, too, were uncomfortable in displacing elected officials. 
They rested their opinions on constitutional grounds, such as the 
contract clause, or on the national government's ability to borrow. 175 
In contrast, the courts had a clearer constitutional mandate and 
greater political support for their decisions in the school-desegre-
gation and prison-reform cases of the past thirty years. 176 
2. Environmental Application of Receivership 
Only recently have courts imposed receivership on state and local 
agencies to enforce environmental statutes. Notwithstanding strong 
language in many federal environmental laws, which suggests Con-
gress's intent to bind government entities as well as industry to the 
permitting procedures and standards laid down, federal courts are 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1170. 
171 Id. 
172 I d. at 1171. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 See Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724, 730--31 (S.D. Ga. 1966). 
176 See Johnson, supra note 151, at 1176-89. 
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cognizant that constitutional violations provide a stronger rationale 
than statutory mandates for displacing local governments. 177 
Courts, as a result, often wait until the prospect of unending 
confrontation and delay dictates the need to place a state or munic-
ipal agency under receivership.178 Even clear evidence of a local 
government's unwillingness to comply with federal and state envi-
ronmental laws may not be sufficient to move a court to assume 
administrative control of a state or municipal entity.179 
In United States v. City of Detroit, 180 however, the Michigan fed-
eral district court imposed receivership on a city agency, on the 
advice of the court's monitor, to facilitate compliance with EPA 
orders and consent decrees. 181 Concerned with the repercussions of 
summarily displacing public officials from their positions of authority, 
the court appointed Detroit's mayor as receiver for the city's waste 
treatment plant. 182 The court thereby avoided making any "radical 
change" in the city's improving waste treatment administration. l83 
At the same time, the court freed the mayor from the bureaucratic 
morass and political bickering that had slowed refinancing and other 
remedial measures. The mayor's decisions were immunized from 
review by the city council, as well as state governments. 184 Hence, 
receivership facilitated statutory enforcement while treading lightly 
on the political process. 
3. Further Environmental Applications 
The considerations that constrain courts from placing public enti-
ties under receivership are not as comp~lling when a private com-
pany is the recalcitrant polluter. Because federalism notions are not 
involved, a court will balance only the potential harm to the corpo-
ration and its shareholders against the plaintiff's claims and the 
public interest in remedying the environmental problems. 185 By plac-
ing private companies into receivership for violations of environ-
177 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1 
178 See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1042 (1977). 
179 See United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 610-11 (1980). 
180 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
181 Id.; see also Town of Greenwich v. Department of Transp., 10 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. lnst.) 20,178,20,181 (D. Conn. 1980). 
182 Detroit, 476 F. Supp. at 515. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 516 
185 See United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595, 623-24 (E.D. Ark. 1987), 
vacated without opinion, 855 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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mental statutes, a court fulfills two purposes. First, the receivership 
accomplishes its traditional function of protecting disputed property 
from fraud, misappropriation, or unnecessary diminution in value. 186 
Because the federal or a state government may be a judgment 
creditor, or may be owed response costs for having conducted a 
preliminary cleanup under CERCLA,187 government entities may 
hold valid pecuniary interests in a defendant's property. A second, 
closely related concern is that a company may attempt to avoid its 
environmental liabilities and responsibilities by transferring its as-
sets to a subsidiary or a new corporate entity. 188 
Because receivership consumes a large portion of a court's time 
and shifts the court from its traditional role as passive arbiter of the 
facts into a role as an active supervisor through its appointed man-
ager, courts hesitate to impose receivership unless other remedies 
are clearly inadequate. 189 There is no compelling reason, however, 
for a court to wait until severe environmental harm has transpired 
or a defendant has flouted statutes and consent decrees before the 
court exercises the full scope of its equitable power. 
In the face of likely dangers to the ecosystem or the public welfare, 
a court may choose initially and immediately to place an entity under 
receivership. In CERCLA, Congress enacted one method of rapid 
response to an environmental hazard-the preliminary government 
cleanup and subsequent suit for cost recovery.l90 The response fund 
is insufficient, however, to address even. a small number of immi-
nently dangerous sites. Furthermore, it is not the EPA's function 
to act as a super-landfill .. contractor. Arguably, though, statutory 
authorization of stringent equitable relief, through receivership, pro-
vides another, more efficient way to tackle environmental hazards. 
IV. IMPROPER "ABDICATION" OR ApPROPRIATE DELEGATION? A 
COMPARISON OF POST-JUDGMENT JUDICIAL REFERENCES TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES 
Federal courts long have acted within the modern administrative 
state by scrutinizing agency decisions for procedural fairness to 
186 See Bookout v. Atlas Fin. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 1974), afl'd sub 
nom. Bookout v. First. Nat. Mortg. & Disc. Co., 514 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1975). 
187 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982) 
188 See Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1455 (W.D. Mich. 1988). 
189 See Comment, supra note 18, at 10,060. 
190 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988). 
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regulated parties,191 and by ordering administrative action to pre-
vent harm to the public welfare. 192 Recently, some federal courts 
have supervised the remedying of complex environmental disputes 
by appointing delegates to implement and monitor the courts' de-
crees. 193 
Commentators question whether judicial references tarnish a 
court's impartiality.194 Litigants, too, chafe at the expense involved, 
and doubt the courts' claimed gains in adjudicatory efficiency. Liti-
gants' challenges mirror those made by regulated parties against 
administrative agency decisionmaking: they refute the delegation of 
binding authority;195 they question the standards that guide the 
agent's discretion;196 and they argue the absence of adequate pro-
cedural safeguards. 197 Administrative law, which governs legisla-
tures' assignment of police powers to legislative and executive 
agents, provides a focus to examine the sufficiency of procedural 
rights granted to litigants when a court refers post-decree tasks to 
an adjunct. The more binding a master's or a monitor's findings and 
recommendations, in essence, the greater is the need for trial-type 
process. 
191 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (outlining factors that courts 
must weigh to gauge the constitutional adequacy of procedures employed in administrative 
actions that infringe upon protected life, liberty, and property interests). Courts also desire 
minimum procedures in order to facilitate judicial review. See Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (to ensure adequate judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706 (1988), of administrative action, 
agency must present a contemporaneous record, not "post-hoc rationalizations" of its decision, 
to the reviewing court). There is a limit, however, to the procedure that a court can require 
agencies to perform. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523-24 (1978) (APA § 553 establishes both the minimum and the 
maximum procedural requirements that courts may impose on administrative agencies in 
conducting rulemaking proceedings). 
192 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584,594-95 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971) (ordering the EPA to initiate public deregistration proceedings against the pesticide 
DDT); see also Oakes, supra note 12, at 506 & n.46 (the EPA's delay, while DDT continued 
to be sold to the public, denied opponents of the pesticide of an opportunity for judicial review 
of the agency's final decision). 
193 See United States v. Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602 (D.R.I. 1980); United States v. 
Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
194 See Dobray, supra note 72, at 596 n.87; Note, Force and Will, supra note 135, at 118-
20 (1980). 
195 In re United States, 816 F.2d 1083, 1086 (6th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff challenged the district 
court's satisfaction of Rule 53's exceptional condition requirement). 
196 In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding master's power to hear motions 
for summary judgment and dismissal). 
197 See Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 120 (2d Cir. 1984) (procedural due process challenge 
to magistrate's appointment). 
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A. Challenging Courts' Reference Authority 
Although courts' reference authority has firm statutory and con-
stitutional bases, litigants often contest particular delegations as an 
abuse of judicial discretion, and masters' and monitors' appointments 
at the remedial stage as violations of article III judicial responsibil-
ities. 198 These challenges, however, are unlikely to hinder post-judg-
ment references by courts mired in complex litigation. Appointing 
and appellate courts' substantive review of agents' findings, more-
over, may be limited. 199 Litigants' concerns for procedural rights are 
therefore heightened. 
Just as administrative agencies' powers are founded and often 
restricted in enabling legislation,20o judicial agents' advisory and 
investigatory authority is based in part on statute. Courts primarily 
look to Federal Rule 53 to ground their references,201 but additionally 
may rely upon an inherent power to appoint assistants to ensure 
compliance with their decrees. 202 While reference authority based 
upon inherent powers speaks to the judiciary's constitutional re-
sponsibility to provide redress and to administer justice, courts' 
powers may be legislatively circumscribed203 and thereby subject to 
statutory procedural requirements. 
Regardless of the source of delegation authority, Rule 53 poses 
barriers to judicial appointments that do not arise in congressional 
198 See Jenkins ex ret. Agyei v. Missouri, 890 F.2d 65, 67 (8th Cir. 1989). 
199 See Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698,712-13 (7th Cir.) (noting 
that district court judge merely approved master's report rather than write a judicial opinion), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984). 
200 The legislation that establishes an administrative agency is known as the agency's organic 
act. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10,301 (1988) (creating the Interstate 
Commerce Commission). Organic acts often delegate broad adjudicatory and rulemaking 
powers. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989). The Supreme Court, 
however, has not invalidated congressional establishment of an administrative agency on 
delegation grounds since 1935. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418-19 (1935). 
Indeed, the Court requires Congress to provide only an "intelligible principle" of control in 
its delegatory statute. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); 
see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 (1989). Appellate courts reviewing trial court references to 
judicial agents, in contrast, occasionally strike such delegations as overbroad. See In re United 
States, 816 F.2d 1083, 1091-92 (6th Cir. 1987) (affinning special master's appointment but 
removing her power to rule on dispositive pretrial motions). 
201 FED. R. Cry. P. 53(a). 
202 E.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1162 
(5th Cir. 1(82), amended in part, vacated in part, reh'g denied in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). 
203 Even Ex parte Peterson, the landmark opinion that voiced courts' inherent equitable 
powers to appoint assistants, recognized that the power may be statutorily restricted. 253 
U.S. at 312. 
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delegations to administrative agencies. By its terms, Rule 53 allows 
a reference to a special master in an "exceptional condition. "204 
Against a long tradition of needless references under federal equity 
practice,205 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co. held that the "exceptional 
condition" limitation renders blanket delegations of particular judi-
cial duties improper, and requires courts to retain the ultimate de-
cisional responsibility.206 Notwithstanding La Buy, however, judges 
easily find circumstances to justify post-judgment references in com-
plex cases. Courts have found "exceptional conditions" in the intri-
cacy of planned remediation,207 in the need to supervise the imple-
mentation of a decree,208 and in the prospect of a defendant's 
noncompliance with an injunction.209 In requesting mandamus, more-
over, an appellant faces the difficult burden of proving that the 
appointing court's reference was a clear abuse of judicial power. 210 
Judicial delegations to post-decree monitors also are attacked as 
constitutionally infirm under article III, section one, which vests the 
federal judicial power in judges of undiminishable salary and 
tenure. 211 Article Ill's purpose is to protect the judicial function 
204 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b). In jury cases, in contrast, a reference may be made "when the 
issues are complicated" although a master's appointment still would be the "exception and not 
the rule." I d. In jury actions, moreover, a master's findings are admissible merely as evidence, 
without binding weight. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e)(3). The distinction is grounded in the seventh 
amendment's requirement that the jury should be the primary fact-finder. See Note, supra 
note 81, at 792 n.89. 
205 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 253 n.5 (1957) (noting that judicial 
references have been deemed an "inveterate enemy of dispatch in the trial of cases") (quoting 
VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION 1240-41 (1952)), reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 1019 (1957); Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. 
James, 272 U.S. 701, 706-07 (1927) (discussing the expense and burden associated with 
traditional references to masters); Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 
131 F.2d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 1942) (decrying the "avoidable burden of costs and ... inexcusable 
delay" caused by references to special masters). 
206 See La Buy, 352 U.S. at 258-59; In re United States Dep't of Defense, 848 F.2d 232, 
239 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
207 Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1160 (5th Cir.), amended in part, vacated in part, reh'g 
denied in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). 
208 Gary W. v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240, 244 (5th Cir. 1979). 
209 NationalOrg. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
210 Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 884 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1047 (1989); 
In re Dep't of Defense, 848 F.2d at 234-35. 
211 See Jenkins ex rei. Agyei v. Missouri, 890 F.2d 65, 67 (8th Cir. 1989). The United States 
Constitution places the judicial power in judges whose salary and tenure are protected: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. 
The judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during 
good Behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, 
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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from encroachment by the legislative and executive branches. 212 
Using the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line CO.,213 which partially invalidated 
the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction as established by the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978,214 contestants claim that certain tasks 
performed by monitors are inherently judicial and therefore 
non-delegable.215 
Such challenges are misplaced. As with other suits concerning 
congressional attempts to create non-article III adjudicatory bodies, 
Northern Pipeline focused on separation-of-powers issues and at-
tempted to define the boundaries among governmental functions. 216 
Northern Pipeline was distinguished in a recent Supreme Court 
opinion that upheld administrative agencies' powers to adjudicate 
state common law claims.217 Unlike judicial delegates, the bank-
ruptcy judges under scrutiny in Northern Pipeline held independent 
jurisdiction to rule on constitutionally recognized and state-created 
common law rights, and were guarded from the district courts' ap-
pointment and removal prerogatives. 218 
Because judicial references do not entail separation-of-powers con-
cerns, federal courts have rejected litigants' article III-based chal-
lenges.219 Commentators note, however, that in reforming state in-
stitutions to safeguard federal constitutional rights, courts 
occasionally have issued vague decrees and subsequently delegated 
primary oversight to masters and monitors, allowing those agents 
to color enforcement of constitutional rights with their own values. 220 
Such ambiguous decrees are not generally at issue in environmental 
actions, in which the federal courts' likely injunctive goals are sat-
isfaction of statutory environmental standards and enforcement of 
consent agreements that have been fashioned by defendants and 
Congress's agent, the EPA. Article Ill's primary mandate, like the 
judicial construct of Rule 53, requires appointing courts to retain 
decisionmaking authority. 
212 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980). 
213 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
214 I d. at 76. 
215 See Jenkins, 890 F.2d at 67. 
216 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50, 57-58 (1982). 
217 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-56 (1986). 
218 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84-87. 
219 See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-84, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980); 
Jenkins, 890 F.2d at 67 n.4. 
220 Dobray, supra note 72, at 590; see Note, supra note 135, at 116. 
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B. Procedural Due Process and the Scope of Judicial Review 
The judicially sanctioned aggrandizement of adjudicatory powers 
to administrative agencies221 contrasts sharply with the courts' re-
straints on judicial references. Once a master's or a monitor's ap-
pointment is made, however, the supervising court likely will exer-
cise limited review of the agent's findings. For litigants, therefore, 
the assurance of procedural rights in hearings before the agent is of 
primary importance. 
There are statutory, and possibly constitutional, sources of pro-
cedural rights for parties who appear before post-judgment judicial 
adjuncts. Rule 53 is the principal guarantor of process, enabling 
parties to force special masters to act through formal proceedings 
that have many trial-type attributes. 222 Through the master, litigants 
can subpoena witnesses223 and, upon a party's request, a master 
must record its evidentiary rulings. 224 A master, moreover, must 
prepare a report of its factual and legal conclusions, ostensibly to 
preserve a meaningful record for judicial review.225 In its reference 
order, an appointing court additionally may specify or curtail a mas-
ter's supervisory and investigatory powers. 226 
The fifth amendment's due process clause227 also may be a fertile 
spring of procedural rights for litigants. In environmental suits, 
courts have used post-judgment judicial references most extensively 
to regulate public entities, and litigants, therefore, have not raised 
procedural due process challenges. Ongoing injunctive supervision 
of a corporate or individual defendant in suits brought by the gov-
ernment against private entities, however, may entail constitution-
ally cognizable deprivations of private property. Although defen-
dants may have had their day in court during a suit's liability phase, 
the majority of defendants' property rights may be decided at the 
remedial stage. 228 While all injunctions alter defendants' future con-
duct in some way, there is no single remedial method for a court to 
221 See supra note 200. 
222 FED. R. Cry. P. 53(e). 
223 FED. R. Cry. P. 53(d)(2). 
224 FED. R. Cry. P. 53(e). 
225 Id. While presiding over hearings, a master may examine witnesses, subpoena docu-
ments, and rule on the admissibility of evidence. FED. R. Cry. P. 53(c). Administrative law 
judges hold similar powers under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1988). Rule 53's reporting 
requirements, too, are echoed in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 557. 
226 FED. R. Cry. P. 53(c). 
227 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
228 See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. 
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accomplish Congress's statutory goals or to satisfy common law 
standards.229 Courts may delegate initial responsibility for the de-
termination of appropriate injunctive relief to an adjunct.23o A court's 
adoption of that adjunct's recommendations on injunctive relief may 
cause minor or possibly severe impacts on a defendant's business. 
These impacts may be sufficient to warrant constitutional protection. 
The quantum of procedure owed to defendants in proceedings 
warranting constitutional protection, before a master or a monitor, 
would turn on three factors: the government plaintiff's concern for 
expeditious action, the extent ofa decree's impact on a defendant's 
property, and technical and scientific uncertainty in remedying the 
environmental hazard. 231 A court readily may find that an EPA suit 
for preliminary injunctive relief implicates stronger governmental 
interests than a cost recovery action and hence justifies less process 
in hearings before a master designated to help forge appropriate 
relief. 232 Due process, however, should mandate that the parties 
ultimately retain an opportunity to object in an adversarial setting 
to a master's recommendations on a remedy. 
The extensive procedural rights that should be afforded litigants 
in hearings before judicial adjuncts become more critical in light of 
the possibility that an appointing court may conduct limited sub-
stantive review of a master's or a monitor's report. 233 Rule 53 directs 
courts to accept masters' factual findings in non-jury actions unless 
229 See supra notes 23--54 and accompanying text. 
230 See United States v. Hardage, 7 Fed. R. Servo 3d 266, 273 (W.D. Okla. 1987). 
231 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In Mathews, the Court announced a 
three-part balancing test for determining the requisite amount of process: 
[d. 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
232 See United States Steel Corp. v. Fri, 364 F. Supp. 1013, 1021 (N.D. Ind. 1973). In Fri 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana refused to enjoin on due 
process grounds an EPA order that required the steel company to report its compliance with 
Clean Air Act standards. [d. The court reasoned that '''where only property rights are 
involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process . . . where 
it is essential that governmental needs be immediately satisfied.'" [d. (quoting Philips v. 
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931». 
233 See Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698,712-13 (7th Cir.) (admon-
ishing but upholding trial court's wholesale adoption of special master's report), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 1018 (1984); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 174-77 
(W.D. Mo. 1985) (reviewing and adopting special master's recommendations on disposition of 
parties' motions). 
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the findings are clearly erroneous234 and thereby reduces the scope 
of courts' scrutiny to appellate-type review.235 The line that distin-
guishes factual determinations from legal conclusions, moreover, is 
often indistinct,236 and the depth of judicial review may be influenced 
as much by the reviewing court's estimation of its master's recom-
mendations as by formulaic legal standards. Overwhelmed by 
crowded dockets, a court may have a strong interest in ending the 
fact-finding process, especially when liability has been adjudged and 
a court's remaining focus centers on the selection of a remedy. Be-
cause a master may assume a partisan, pro-plaintiff role, a court's 
greatest responsibility may be to restrain its adjunct's remedial 
zeal. 237 
V. CONCLUSION 
The courts are not the primary authors of environmental maxims. 
Congress has defined broadly the environmental responsibilities of 
commercial and governmental entities, and has given the initial tasks 
of interpreting and implementing its statutes to the states and to its 
agencies. 
Congress also has recognized, however, the judiciary's traditional 
role in balancing the equities of particular controversies and fashion-
ing precise, coercive remedies to abate the public endangerment 
posed by environmental hazards. Courts hold inherent constitutional 
powers, in addition to statutory authority, to review the environ-
mental regulatory decisions of other branches of government and to 
furnish injured parties with meaningful redress. To satisfy these 
duties, courts may provide for themselves the means to ascertain 
·and implement the most feasible decrees. 
Although often decried by litigants, judicial references to special 
masters and post-judgment monitors do not tarnish the courts, but 
offer a mechanism through which the courts can assume oversight 
and supervision of recalcitrant polluters. The judiciary thus becomes 
234 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e)(2). 
235 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court, 
however, is not bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the clearly erroneous 
standard in Rule 53(e)(2), and may conduct an independent review of a master's record. 
Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289,296-97 & n.l (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
236 L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270-71 (1930). 
237 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1162 (5th Cir.), amended in part, vacated in part, 
reh'g denied in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Little, 
supra note 16, at 469 n.270. 
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a viable supplement and alternative to administrative action for 
extensive and continuing environmental redress. As in administra-
tive decisions, however, the creation of a remedy may be as critical 
to the litigants and the public as the determination of liability, and 
the fullest airing of the merits of a remedy may occur before an 
agent rather than a court. 
\ 
